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Keep socialist blog En Passant going - donate now
If you want to keep a blog that makes the arguments every day against the ravages of capitalism going and keeps alive the flame of democracy and community, make a donation to help cover my costs. And of course keep reading the blog. To donate click here. Keep socialist blog En Passant going. More... (4)

Sprouting sh*t for almost nothing
You can prove my 2 ex-comrades wrong by donating to my blog En Passant at BSB: 062914 Account: 1067 5257, the Commonwealth Bank in Tuggeranong, ACT. More... (12)

My interview Razor Sharp 18 February
Me interviewed by Sharon Firebrace on Razor Sharp on Tuesday 18 February. http://sharonfirebrace.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/18-2-14-john-passant-aust-national-university-g20-meeting-age-of-enttilement-engineers-attack-of-austerity-hardship-on-civilians.mp3 (0)

My interview Razor Sharp 11 February 2014
Me interviewed by Sharon Firebrace on Razor Sharp this morning. The Royal Commission, car industry and age of entitlement get a lot of the coverage. http://sharonfirebrace.com/2014/02/11/john-passant-aust-national-university-canberra-2/ (0)

Razor Sharp 4 February 2014
Me on 4 February 2014 on Razor Sharp with Sharon Firebrace. http://sharonfirebrace.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/4-2-14-john-passant-aust-national-university-canberra-end-of-the-age-of-entitlement-for-the-needy-but-pandering-to-the-lusts-of-the-greedy.mp3 (0)

Time for a House Un-Australian Activities Committee?
Tony Abbott thinks the Australian Broadcasting Corporation is Un-Australian. I am looking forward to his government setting up the House Un-Australian Activities Committee. (1)

Make Gina Rinehart work for her dole
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Sick kids and paying upfront

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Save Medicare

Demonstrate in defence of Medicare at Sydney Town Hall 1 pm Saturday 4 January (0)

Me on Razor Sharp this morning
Me interviewed by Sharon Firebrace this morning for Razor Sharp. It happens every Tuesday. http://sharonfirebrace.com/2013/12/03/john-passant-australian-national-university-8/ (0)

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Between revolt and repression in Iran

BLOODY REPRESSION in the streets, political maneuvering at the top, and continued popular organizing from below signal a new stage in Iran’s post-election crisis as the country’s ruling class is increasingly haunted by the specter of revolution. Lee Sustar reports on the situation for Socialist Alternative.

The crackdown intensified five days after the June 16 demonstration of up to 2 million people in Tehran protesting the disputed reelection claim of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Offices were shut down as large numbers of workers stayed away from their jobs.

This great outpouring recalled the 1979 revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran, the hated U.S.-backed dictator. Many protesters revived the anti-Shah chant, “Down with the dictator.”

Video and photos of the great mobilization inspired people around the world who support democracy and social justice–and set off alarm bells for despots in the Middle East. While the Iranian protests began over a stolen presidential election, their increasing size and intensity raises the possibility of revolutionary change in Iran and beyond.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared during Friday prayers June 19 that there would be “bloodshed and chaos” if the protests continued. “Street challenge is not acceptable,” he declared.

The basij militias–paramilitary groups that patrol the streets for supposedly un-Islamic behavior, such as immodest dress by women–made good on Khamanei’s threats, attacking supporters of reformist presidential candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi the following day.

One killing captured on video–the shooting of 21-year-old Neda Agha Soltan on June 20–quickly came to symbolize the human toll of the vicious crackdown. But as with previous attacks, protesters fought back–even though their numbers were smaller than previous protests.

As a university professor wrote of his decision to demonstrate that day, along with students:

After the Supreme Leader’s fierce speech at the Friday prayers, we knew that today we would be different. We feel so vulnerable, more than ever, but at the same time are aware of our power. No matter how strong it is collectively, it will do little to protect us today. We could only take our bones and flesh to the streets and expose them to batons and bullets. Two different feelings fight inside me without mixing with one another. To live or to just be alive, that’s the question.

He added:

Here’s a true battleground. And this time, it’s huge. Columns of smoke rise to the sky. You can hardly see the asphalt. Only bricks and stones. Here, people have the upper hand. Three lanes, the middle one separated by opaque fences, under construction for the metro.

The workers have climbed up the fences and show the V [for victory] sign. They start throwing stone and timber to the street to supply the armament. I tell myself, “Look at the poor, the ones Ahmadinejad always speaks of.” But the president’s name is no longer in fashion. This time, the slogans address the leader, something unheard of in the past three decades. It’s a beautiful sunset, with rays of light penetrating evening clouds. We feel safe among people moving back forth with the anti-riot police attacks.

That day, using batons, chains, knives and occasionally bullets, the basij injured and arrested hundreds of people. Security personnel also added to the death toll among protesters, which official reports put at 19 as of June 22.

The overwhelming security presence on the street, along with violent attacks on university dormitories and arrests of prominent opposition figures, has made protest increasingly difficult the following days–police even prevented a funeral service for Neda Agha Soltan.

DESPITE THE repression, the mass movement that took shape around Mousavi’s election campaign has already been transformed into a broader fight for democracy. It will not dissipate anytime soon, whatever the intention of the candidate and his handlers.

In Tehran, protesters unable to mount street protests have taken to literally shouting from the rooftops at night to show their continued defiance. The mass demonstrations may have subsided owing to the crackdown, but the movement has not been crushed. The movement may be regrouping, but it has not disappeared.

This pressure has pushed Mousavi–a moderate former prime minister–into the unlikely role of champion for democratic reform.

A Facebook page attributed to Mousavi stated that he is “ready for martyrdom” and called on his supporters to carry out a general strike if he is arrested. And in an open letter to supporters issued June 21, Mousavi declared that, if allowed to stand, Iran’s election fraud would validate criticisms that Islam and democracy were incompatible:

If the high volume of cheating and vote manipulation that has put a fire to the foundations of people’s trust is itself introduced as the proof and evidence of the lack of fraud, the republicanism of the regime will be slaughtered and the idea of incompatibility of Islam and republicanism would be practically proven.

Such statements reflect the enormous pressure that the mass movement has put on the reformist leader. “Poor Mousavi, we took the easel away from his hands and gave him a gun,” one supporter joked to the Financial Times, in a reference to the candidate’s turn to painting while he was out of the public eye for most of the last two decades.

Yet it is far from clear that Mousavi is willing to use the “gun” of wider mobilizations and general strikes to force a recount of the stolen election or a rerun vote, let alone thoroughgoing democratic reforms. As an establishment politician and an integral member of the Iranian ruling class, he will be extremely reluctant to call forth the semi-underground labor movement that has waged intermittent strikes and protests since 2004.

Iranian reformers–like, for example, former President Mahmoud Khatami–have always oriented to educated and upper-class liberals while pursuing economic policies detrimental to workers and the poor. As a result, Ahmadinejad was able to strike a populist pose to win the 2005 presidential elections–with the help of vote fraud to get into a runoff election, which he won handily against Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a powerful cleric, former president and one of the richest men in Iran.

In office, Ahmadinejad was anything but a friend to the working class. He pursued policies of privatization to enrich his coterie around the national security apparatus and ruthlessly suppressed efforts at organizing independent unions. He tried to maintain popularity through a nationalist stance, defending Iran’s nuclear energy program against pressure from the West.

And in the run-up to the June 12 vote, Ahmadinejad made much-publicized handouts to the poor and bonuses for government employees to boost turnout for the election. He apparently assumed that middle-class liberals, disillusioned by Khatami’s failure to stand up to attacks on pro-democracy activists, would stay home, as they had in 2005.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

BY 2009, Ahmadinejad faced a challenge from both Mousavi and Rafsanjani. These former rivals–Rafsanjani had ousted Mousavi by abolishing the post of prime minister in 1989–made common cause to stop Ahmadinejad from consolidating power.

The Iranian president, with the backing of Khamenei, had systematically installed figures from the basij and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into key positions in government and the national oil company, displacing or squeezing the big capitalists around Rafsanjani, who jealously guard that turf. Beyond personnel questions, however, Iranian capitalists are leery of Ahmadinejad’s half-baked “development” projects that used state oil revenues to consolidate his base among the poor, rather than spending the money on strategic investments.

For his part, Mousavi was seen as an ideal candidate for the power brokers around Rafsanjani as well as the reformists. Having stressed the social justice side of Islam while prime minister during the Iran-Iraq war, he can appeal to workers and the poor in a way that Rafsanjani never could. He also has credentials as a hard-liner: as prime minister, he presided over the execution of as many as 5,000 political prisoners.

Nowadays, though, Mousavi portrays himself as a liberal by championing the rights of women and national minorities–an effort that helped revived an interest in politics among Khatami’s voters.

Mousavi’s support, which surged into the streets of Tehran and other cities in the days before the election, forced Ahmadinejad to resort to massive vote fraud to claim victory.

According to a study by the British think tank Chatham House, the number of votes cast in the provinces of Mazandaran and Yazd exceed the total number of eligible voters. The authors estimate that if Ahmadinejad really won 62 percent of the vote claimed by the authorities, he would have had to won the votes of all new voters, all the votes of his last centrist rival, plus 44 percent of those who voted for reformist candidates in 2005. This is so unlikely as to be absurd.

As the speaker of Iran’s parliament, Ali Larijani, said on television June 20, “A majority of people are of the opinion that the actual election results are different from what was officially announced,” adding, “Although the Guardian Council is made up of religious individuals, I wish certain members would not side with a certain presidential candidate.”

As popular pressure mounted, the head of the 12-member Guardian Council, the body of clerics that approves election candidates, issued a surprising report June 22 that votes supposedly cast in more than 50 Iranian cities were actually higher than the number of eligible voters.

The Guardian Council’s announcement contradicts the earlier claim by Khamanei that Ahmadinejad had won a “definitive victory,” and marks a retreat from the council’s earlier position that it would only review 10 percent of the ballots.

Now there are even doubts that the council will uphold the election results when it makes its final ruling in the coming days. This vacillation partly reflects the influence of Rafsanjani, one of the most powerful members of the Guardian Council. But if the council reverses course and annuls the election or orders a recall, it will be because the clerics fear a revolutionary upsurge. Having hijacked a workers’ revolution to take power 30 years ago, the clerics understand full well the risks they face.

At the same time, Rafsanjani is rumored to be trying to assemble an emergency meeting of the 86-member Council of Experts, which chooses the Iran’s supreme leader. The apparent aim is to remove Khamenei from power, which would decisively weaken Ahmadinejad as well.

Adding fuel to the fire is Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, the country’s senior cleric, who endorsed protests to “claim rights.” According to religious criteria, Montazeri should have been the successor to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founding leader of the Islamic Republic in 1979, but was shoved aside and later placed under house arrest for several years.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

IN SHORT, the competing factions of the Iranian ruling class are hesitating before they make irrevocable choices that could shatter the Islamist regime.

For Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, the question is whether a crackdown would succeed in drowning resistance in blood–or provoke a wider revolutionary challenge to their rule. For Mousavi and Rafsanjani, the choice is whether to accept a humiliating deal that would greatly diminish their power, or encourage the rebellion, and try to ride it to victory.

Meanwhile, the potential for far broader struggle for democracy is apparent. The Tehran bus drivers’ union, which has fought to improve wages and conditions, despite the beatings and arrests of union leaders, issued this statement June 20:

The fact that the demands of the vast majority of Iranian society go far beyond those of unions is obvious to all, and in the previous years, we have emphasized that until the principle of the freedom to organize and to elect is not materialized, any talk of social freedom and labor union rights will be a farce.

Given these facts, the Autobus Workers Union places itself alongside all those who are offering themselves in the struggle to build a free and independent civic society. The union condemns any kind of suppression and threats.

To recognize labor union and social rights in Iran, the international labor organizations have declared the Fifth of Tir (June 26) the international day of support for imprisoned Iranian workers as well as for the institution of unions in Iran. We want that this day be viewed as more than a day for the demands of labor unions to make it a day for human rights in Iran and to ask all our fellow workers to struggle for the trampled rights of the majority of the people of Iran.

With hope for the spread of justice and freedom,
Autobus Workers Union

It’s impossible to predict the next turn of events in Iran. But what is clear is that the struggles of the Iranian working class–not the maneuvers at the top of society–are the key to taking the movement forward.

Iran was in uncharted political territory following mass protests against what was almost certainly a rigged presidential election victory for incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The long-festering divisions in the Iranian ruling class have become wide-open splits as the result of mass support for the reformist presidential candidate, Mir Hussein Mousavi.

A vicious police crackdown on demonstrations in the capital city of Tehran was accompanied by the arrest of more than 130 prominent Mousavi supporters–including Mohammad Reza Khatami, the brother of former President Mahmoud Khatami, a former speaker of the parliament, and the son-in-law of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a leader of the 1979 Islamist revolution.

Other figures rounded up by police include Mostafa Tajzadeh, a minister of the interior under Khatami; Behzad Nabavi, a former minister of industry; and Mohsen Mirdamadi, organizer of the 1979 occupation of the U.S. Embassy.

In the past, such crackdowns were aimed mostly at liberal newspaper editors, human rights activists and labor union organizers. Now major politicians are getting the same treatment from Ahmadinejad, who the street protesters call a dictator and liken to the former Shah of Iran, the U.S.-backed strongman who was toppled in 1979.

This struggle at the top of Iranian society may lead to more rebellion from below. Unlike previous elections, where even victims of election fraud swallowed the results, Mousavi has refused to do so. Instead, he called on his supporters to remain on the streets, and formally requested that the authorities grant permission to hold further protests.

Hard-fought presidential elections–including vote stealing to boost the tally by one or two percentage points–are nothing new in post-revolution Iran. But Ahmadinejad’s claim of more than 62 percent of the vote isn’t credible.

While it’s possible that the president’s support among the poor, particularly in rural areas, could have made him the top vote getter among five rivals, it’s highly unlikely that he could have captured an outright majority to avoid a second-round election between the top two candidates.

The most obvious sign of fraud is that the losing candidates failed to win even their own hometowns and regions, according to election authorities–which is practically unheard of in Iran. For example, Mousavi, according to the official results, did badly in the province of Azerbaijan, even though he is an Azeri who is popular there.

The question is: Why would Ahmadinejad risk such an obvious and crude manipulation of the voting results?

Any answer at this point is speculation. But there is a logic to stealing the election, and by an overwhelming margin–by claiming an outright majority of the vote, Ahmadinejad could avoid a second-round runoff election against Mousavi, his main competitor.

In the last days before the June 12 vote, Mousavi’s backers mobilized demonstrations of hundreds of thousands, not just in the capital city of Tehran, but in provincial cities as well. Ahmadinejad likely feared that even bigger protests would unfold in a second round, and give Mousavi a victory. The apparent calculation was that it would be safer to declare a first-round victory to put a decisive end to any challenge. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, endorsed the election results in the hopes of restoring order.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

NATURALLY, THE election results spurred more protests. So far, the demonstrations have withstood violent attacks by police and paramilitary groups known as basij, who patrol the streets for supposedly un-Islamic behavior such as immodest dress by women.

And by hardening the divisions in the Iranian ruling class, the election fraud has ushered in a new era in Iranian politics, in which rival groupings may finally crystallize into something like permanent political parties–a development that has until now been blocked by the Shia Islamist clerical establishment at the core of Iranian politics.

So what comes next is anybody’s guess. But to better understand Iran’s political dynamics, it’s helpful to look at the social base of the leading candidates.

Ahmadinejad, as a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s and the armed forces’ Revolutionary Guard, is the representative of the hard right within the clergy and Iran’s national security apparatus.

Relatively unknown when he ran as a candidate in the 2005 elections, he was able–thanks to what were likely stolen votes–to get into a runoff election. His opponent was another conservative, the former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. By campaigning as a populist, Ahmadinejad handily defeated Rafsanjani, one of the richest men in Iran and the representative of big capital.

Upon taking office, Ahmadinejad aimed to roll back the liberal policies of the previous administration of reformer Mahmoud Khatami. In his eight years in office, Khatami had taken a more liberal stance on social issues in order to cultivate the educated middle class, while forging economic ties with Western European capital.

But Khatami failed to stand up to hard-liners’ attacks on liberal students and the media, and had little to offer the working class or the poor. Ahmadinejad could thus benefit from the cynicism of the middle class intelligentsia toward the reformers, while promising a better day for the working-class majority.

Once in office, Ahmadinejad tapped into record-high state oil revenues in an attempt to consolidate his political base. Handouts to the poor, bonuses to government employees and local development projects were central to his economic policy. And by boosting consumption of workers and the poor, this state spending boosted the income of the bazaar–the small business interests that are the backbone of the Iranian hard right.

Other factions in the Iranian ruling class viewed these policies with growing alarm. In the view of figures like Rafsanjani, spending on scattershot social programs and Latin American-style clientelism was robbing the economy of money needed for investment–in particular to modernize the oil and gas industry. Many were leery of Ahmadinejad’s confrontational approach to the West over Iran’s nuclear program, arguing that it wasn’t worth the cost of sanctions on Iran’s economy.

Meanwhile, the educated middle class and professionals increasingly chafed at Ahmadinejad’s heavy-handed attempts to re-impose the social norms of the Islamist revolution. Furthermore, the working class saw its income constantly eroded by inflation, and efforts to organize unions were met with harsh repression under Ahmadinejad. The president even attempted to roll back price subsidies for staple goods for the poor, and corruption, long a feature of Iranian government, continued.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

FOR THESE reasons, Mousavi and his supporters saw an opportunity to unseat Ahmadinejad.

The effort brought together some unlikely allies. One of Mousavi’s main backers is Rafsanjani, even though it was Rafsanjani who, two decades ago, pushed through the abolition of the office of prime minister in order to oust Mousavi, who then held the post. Back then, Mousavi was a proponent of a state capitalist economic policy that advocated restrictions on imports and government control of key industries. Rafsanjani, a champion of private property rights, was determined to isolate him, and largely succeeded.

Today, however, Mousavi’s economic program is closer to that of Rafsanjani. “He advocated economic liberalization, and pledged to control inflation through monetary policies and make life easier for private business,” British journalist Robert Fisk wrote.

While Mousavi’s calls for women’s rights and greater political freedom inspired student activists and the middle class, he made no real outreach to workers and the poor, leaving the field open to Ahmadinejad. Thus, the Iranian president accused Rafsanjani of being corrupt during a televised presidential debate. (The reformist presidential candidate, Karroubi, also failed to put economic issues at the center of his campaign.)

In the post-election crisis, the limitations of the reformers’ social base have been exposed. A struggle to oust Ahmadinejad would require far more militant mass action than anything yet seen. But it seems doubtful, to say the least, that Mousavi, who has spent the last three decades in the political hierarchy, would call for workers’ strikes or insurrections.

He’ll be tempted to play an inside-outside game, appealing for street actions while counting on Rafsanjani–the head of the clerics’ Expediency Council and a consummate powerbroker–to cut some kind of deal with Ahmadinejad.

It may be too late for that, however. Continued protests and repression may compel Mousavi and his allies to build some sort of underground opposition. In fact, Ahmadinejad has already accused Mousavi of trying to mount a “velvet revolution,” styled after the 1989 demonstrations that overthrew the Stalinist regime in Czechoslovakia.

Certainly, the U.S. will try to use Iran’s power struggle to its own advantage by ratcheting up diplomatic pressure and increasing the usual CIA efforts to try to co-opt sections of the opposition. This will be a gift to Ahmadinejad, who will use any such efforts as a pretext to denounce, if not smash, the opposition.

Real democratic change in Iran won’t come from U.S. intervention, but from a broadening and deepening of the protest movement.

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Pingback from En Passant » Chavez supports Iranian dictators
Time June 26, 2009 at 11:27 am

[…] have posted a number of articles on Iran on this site, including Iran pauses, Between revolt and repression in Iran, Iran boils over, Iran: prospects for revolution: rough notes for a talk, Iran: the interrupted […]

Pingback from En Passant » Crap Corner – Greg Sheridan from The Australian, again
Time July 2, 2009 at 2:57 pm

[…] pauses; Between revolt and repression in Iran; Iran: a general strike?; Iran boils over; Chavez supports iranian dictators; Iranian Embassy […]